A new notion of security boundary is introduced to model multilevel security policies in the scenario of mobile systems, within Cardelli and Gordon's "pure" mobile ambients calculus. Information leakage may be expressed in terms of the possibility for a hostile ambient to access conÿdential data that are not protected inside a security boundary. A control ow analysis is deÿned, as a reÿnement of the Hansen-Jensen-Nielsons's CFA, that allows to properly capture boundary crossings. In this way, direct information leakage may be statically detected.
1. Introduction
The problem
In distributed systems, resources and data are shared among users with di erent locations, yielding to a number of security issues that are object of an increasing number of research projects. Mobile ambients calculus has been introduced by Cardelli and Gordon in [3] to model both mobile computation and mobile systems. A challenging problem, within this setting, is to properly tackle security issues.
We focus on multilevel security, a particular mandatory access control security policy: every entity is bound to a security level (for simplicity, we consider only two levels: high and low), and information may just ow from the low-level to the high one. Typically, two access rules are imposed: (i) No Read Up, a low-level entity cannot access information of a high-level entity; (ii) No Write Down, a high-level entity cannot leak information to a low-level entity. Sometimes, these two access controls are not enough as information may be indirectly leaked, through, e.g., some system side e ect: a typical example is represented by a resource shared among the security levels which may be alternatively overloaded by some high-level Trojan horse program (causing, e.g., longer response time at all security levels) in order to transmit information to a malicious low-level entity. These indirect ways of transmitting information are called covert channels. Fig. 1 summarizes this policy. In order to detect information leakages, a typical approach (see, e.g., [4 -9] ) consists in directly deÿning what is an information ow from one level to another one. Then, it is su cient to verify that, in any system execution, no information ow is possible from level high to level low. This is the approach we follow in this paper.
The scenario
We will consider information ow security in the scenario of mobile systems. This particular setting, where code may migrate from one security level to another one, complicates even further the problem of capturing all the possible information leakages. As an example, conÿdential data may be read by an authorized agent which, moving around, could expose them to unexpected attacks. Moreover, the code itself could be conÿdential, and so not allowed to be read=executed by lower levels.
In order to study this problem as much abstractly as possible, we consider the "pure" mobile ambients calculus [3] , in which no communication channels are present and the only possible actions are represented by the moves performed by mobile processes. This allows to study a very general notion of information ow which should be applicable also to more "concrete" versions of the calculus (e.g., [10, 11] ).
Veriÿcation
We introduce the new notion of "security boundary", that allows to identify ambients that may guarantee to properly protect their content. The intuition is the following: to guarantee absence of information leakage, every high-level data or process should be encapsulated into a boundary ambient, and a boundary ambient can be opened only when it is nested into another boundary ambient. Then, we may even allow that low-level information=processes interfere with high-level data inside a boundary ambient, but we want to be sure that once this happens, the low information=process is trapped: it can neither carry high-level information out of the boundary ambient nor move out of it.
Instead of proposing a new variant of ambient calculus to apply and develop this ideas, we adopt a static analysis approach: given a process P, and a partition of its ambient and capability labels into "high", "low", and "boundary" sets, we aim at providing methods and tools to verify that in every execution of process P no direct information leakage occurs.
A ÿrst approach to this issue may consist in introducing syntactic restrictions on process P, as initially proposed in [2] . A less restrictive and more accurate solution can be obtained by reÿning the control ow analysis by Hansen et al. [12] .
The aim of the analysis proposed in [12] is to calculate an over approximation of ambient nestings, i.e., the analysis returns a set which contains all the ambient nestings that are possible at run-time. However, the fact that all nestings are collected in a unique set, may introduce some "fake" nestings in the result. As an example, consider a low-level ambient ' that moves inside a boundary b and, after that, is entered by a high-level ambient h. The initial and the ÿnal situation may be depicted as If we write down all the nestings in the form (x; y) meaning that "x may contain y", we obtain (env; '); (env; b); (b; h) from the initial state, plus ('; h) from the ÿnal one. From this " at" representation, we obtain (env; ') and ('; h), i.e., a fake nesting showing that h is unprotected (because outside of b), thus possibly exposed to environment attacks. Here, we propose a more accurate abstract domain that separately considers nestings inside and outside boundaries, yielding to a much more sophisticated control ow analysis. The example above will be analyzed through two separate sets of nestings, (env; '); (env; b) and (b; h); (b; ')('; h), representing the possible nestings outside and inside boundaries, respectively. Note that now we do not have a nesting path leading from env to h. The fake nesting above is not derived by our analysis as it keeps track that h is inside ' only when ' is inside some boundaries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic terminology on ambient calculus and we brie y report the control ow analysis of [12] . In Section 3, we present the model of multilevel security for mobile agents and we show how to guarantee absence of unwanted information ows through simple syntactic restrictions. In Section 4, we introduce the reÿned control ow analysis, which is proved to be correct in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper with ÿnal remarks and comparisons with related works.
Background
In this section we introduce the basic terminology of ambient calculus and we brie y report the control ow analysis of [12] .
Mobile ambients
The mobile ambients calculus has been introduced in [3] with the main purpose of explicitly modeling mobility. Indeed, ambients are arbitrarily nested boundaries which can move around through suitable capabilities. The syntax of processes is given as follows, where n ∈ Amb denotes an ambient name.
t n:P capability to enter n | out 't n:P capability to exit n | Open ' t n:P capability to open n Labels ' a ∈ Lab a on ambients and labels ' t ∈ Lab t on transitions are introduced as it is customary in static analysis to indicate "program points". They will be useful in the next section when developing the analysis.
Intuitively, the restriction ( n)P introduces the new name n and limits its scope to P; process 0 does nothing; P | Q is P and Q running in parallel; replication provides recursion and iteration as !P represents any number of copies of P in parallel. By n ' a [P] we denote the ambient named n with the process P running inside it. The capabilities in ' t n and out ' t n move their enclosing ambients in and out ambient n, respectively; the capability open ' t n is used to dissolve the boundary of a sibling ambient n. The operational semantics of a process P is given through a suitable reduction relation → and a structural congruence ≡ between processes (see Appendix A for more details). Intuitively, P → Q represents the possibility for P of reducing to Q through some computation. 
Control ow analysis
The control ow analysis described in [12] aims at modeling which processes can be inside what other processes. It works on pairs (Î;Ĥ ), where:
• The ÿrst componentÎ is an element of˝(Lab a × (Lab a ∪ Lab t )). If a process contains an ambient labeled ' a having inside either a capability or an ambient labeled ', then (' a ; ') is expected to belong toÎ .
• The second componentĤ ∈˝(Lab a × Amb) keeps track of the correspondence between names and labels. If a process contains an ambient labeled ' a with name n, then (' a ; n) is expected to belong toĤ .
• The pairs are component-wise partially ordered.
The analysis is deÿned by a representation function and a speciÿcation. 1 They are recalled, respectively, in Figs. 2 and 3 .
The representation function aims at mapping concrete values to their best abstract representation. It is given in terms of a function ÿ CF ' (P) which basically builds setsÎ andĤ corresponding to process P, with respect to an enclosing ambient labeled '. The representation of a process P is deÿned as ÿ CF env (P), where env is a special label corresponding to the environment.
Example 2.1. Let P be a process of the form:
; thus the representation function of P is the following:
The speciÿcation depicts how the process transforms one abstract representation to another one, and it mostly amounts on recursive check of subprocesses except for the three capabilities open, in, and out. The rule for open-capability says that if some ambient labeled '
a has an open-capability ' t on an ambient n, that may apply due to the presence of a sibling ambient labeled ' a whose Fig. 3 . Speciÿcation of the control ow analysis.
name is n, then the result of performing that capability should also be recorded inÎ , i.e. all the ambients=capabilities nested in ' a have to be nested also in ' a . The in and out capabilities behave similarly. Theorem 2.3. Let P and Q be two processes such that
Intuitively, whenever (Î;Ĥ ) |= CF P and the representation of P is contained in (Î;Ĥ ), we are assured that every nesting of ambients and capabilities in every possible derivative of P is also captured in (Î;Ĥ ).
It is important to recall that the resulting control ow analysis applies to any process, and that every process enjoys a least analysis.
Information ow
In this section, we present a formalization of multilevel security in the setting of mobile ambients (Section 3.1). We apply the control ow of Section 2.2 to the veriÿcation of multilevel security and we show that in some cases it is too approximate (Section 3.2). Then, a simple syntactic property is given which allows to very e ciently verify the absence of unwanted information ows and which also solves some of the approximation problems of the control ow (Section 3.3).
Modeling multilevel security
In order to deÿne multilevel security in mobile ambients we ÿrst need to classify information into di erent levels of conÿdentiality. We do this by exploiting the labeling of ambients. In particular, we partition the set of ambient labels Lab a into three disjoint sets Lab Given a process, the multilevel security policy may be established by deciding which ambients are the ones responsible for conÿning conÿdential information. These are all labeled with boundary labels from set Lab a B and we will refer to them as boundary ambients. Thus, all the high-level ambients must be contained in a boundary ambient and labeled with labels from set Lab 
where Q contains some low-level ambients. Ambient container is a boundary for the high-level data hdata (note that data are abstractly represented as ambients). This process is an example of a direct information ow. Indeed, P may evolve to container
where the high-level hdata is out of any boundary ambient, thus vulnerable and potentially accessible by any ambient or process in Q. 2 This ow of high-level data=ambients outside the security boundaries is exactly what we intend to control and avoid. It may be formalized as follows.
Deÿnition 3.1 (Unprotected). Given a process P and a labeling Lab a ; Unprotected ('; (Î;Ĥ )) = true iff ∃' 1 ; : : : ; ' n ∈ Lab a L s:t (env; ' 1 ); (' 1 ; ' 2 ); : : : ; (' n−1 ; ' n ); (' n ; ') Î .
Deÿnition 3.2 (Protected). Given a process P and a labeling Lab
a ; Protected ('; (Î;Ĥ )) = true i @ Unprotected ('; (Î;Ĥ )).
Deÿnition 3.3 (Information leakage). Given a process P and a labeling Lab
In distributed and mobile systems, it is unrealistic to consider a unique boundary, containing all the conÿdential information. As an example consider two di erent sites venice and london, each with some set of conÿdential information that need to be protected. This can be modeled by deÿning two boundary ambients, one for each site:
In order to make the model applicable, it is certainly needed a mechanism for moving conÿdential data from one boundary to another one. This is achieved through another boundary ambient which moves out from the ÿrst protected area and into the second one. The following example, also depicted in Fig. 4 , describes the exchange of conÿdential information between the two sites venice and london:
The process may evolve to the following one (see steps (b) and (c) of Fig. 4 ):
and ÿnally to (see step (d) of Fig. 4 ):
Note that send is labeled as a boundary ambient. Thus, high-level data hdata is always protected by boundary ambients, during the whole execution. Observe that in this example we use the same label for all boundary ambients. If we were interested to distinguish ambient nestings inside di erent boundaries, it would be enough to assign di erent boundary labels.
Verifying absence of information leakage
In this section, we study how to verify that no leakage of secret data=ambients outside the boundary ambients is possible. A natural approach could be the direct application of the control ow of [12] reported in Section 2.2.
Proof. By contradiction; assume that P leaks secret h; thus there exists a process Q s.t. P → * Q and Unprotected (h; ÿ CF (Q)). By iterating Theorem 2.3; we obtain that ÿ CF (Q) (Î;Ĥ ). From Unprotected (h; ÿ CF (Q)) and ÿ CF (Q) (Î;Ĥ ); it follows that Unprotected (h; (Î;Ĥ )); leading to a contradiction.
As an example, consider again the process presented above:
The least analysis for this process can be easily shown to be the following:
Notice that h is always contained inside b, i.e., it is protected by a boundary ambient. Formally, ÿ CF env (P 2 ) (Î 2 ;Ĥ 2 ), (Î 2 ;Ĥ 2 ) |= CF P 2 and Protected (h; (Î 2 ;Ĥ 2 )), thus Corollary 3.4 guarantees that P 2 does not leak secret h. However, the fact that the analysis simply collects all the potential nesting without considering the temporal ordering of the events, may sometimes lead to unnecessary approximations. As an example, consider again process P 2 above, and suppose that high-level data is willing to enter some ÿlter process, which could possibly be low-level code:
Note that the ÿlter behaves correctly with respect to multilevel security rules, i.e., it only enters boundaries. In particular, this means that it will never carry high-level data outside the security boundaries. However, if we perform the control ow analysis we obtain the following least solution: Note that in this solution h appears at the environment level, leading to Unprotected (h; (Î 3 ;Ĥ 3 ))), showing a potential attack. However, as observed before, there is no execution leading to such a situation. The reason why the analysis looses precision here, is due to the fact that h enters an m ambient which might be opened at the environment level, but the analysis does not capture the fact that h enters m only after it has crossed the boundary, and then it never gets out of it.
A syntactic approach
Syntactic conditions may be imposed on processes that are su cient to prove the absence of leakage of secret data=ambients outside the boundary ambients. Moreover, such conditions properly deal with the situation discussed before. Let us brie y recall the main results in this direction, as ÿrst presented in [2] .
The idea is to control the out l n and open l n capabilities executed on a boundary ambient n. In particular, we require that such capabilities may only be performed by boundary ambients.
First t to the set of ambient names on which all the capabilities labeled by ' t operate. Given a process P, the conditions that should be imposed on (Î 0 ;Ĥ 0 ) = ÿ CF env (P) to guarantee absence of information leakage are the following:
Observe that condition (i) turns out to be a well-formedness condition over labeling. It requires that all the out and open capabilities that operate on boundary ambients are labeled as boundary moves (i.e., with labels in set Lab t BM ). If this condition is initially satisÿed by P (i.e., by ÿ CF env (P)), then it will hold also for every derivative of P, as the labeling cannot change during process execution.
Condition (ii) requires that every out and open boundary move is executed inside a boundary ambient. Note that, in general, this may be not preserved when P evolves. Indeed, the following theorem states that also condition (ii) is preserved, within every execution of P. Proof. Let (Î ÿ ;Ĥ ÿ ) = ÿ CF env (P); and assume (Î ÿ ;Ĥ ÿ ) fulÿlls conditions (i) and (ii). Now consider the least solution (Î;Ĥ ) |= CF P (such that ÿ CF env (P) (Î;Ĥ )). To be a least solution; a pair (Î;Ĥ ) must satisfyĤ =Ĥ ÿ . In fact; notice that the analysis requires no changes toĤ ; thus the least H containingĤ ÿ isĤ ÿ itself. This proves that the least solution (Î;Ĥ ) satisÿes (i).
Let us now turn to the ÿrst component of (Î;Ĥ ). A way for calculating the least solution is to start from ÿ CF env (P), and then add all the pairs required by the analysis, until a ÿx point is reached. Notice that every nesting inÎ \Î ÿ (i.e., all the nestings added by the analysis) should have been required by at least one of the capability rules. If this is not the case, we could remove this kind of nestings, obtaining a smaller analysis, leading to a contradiction.
Let ('; ' ) ∈Î \Î ÿ and ' ∈ Lab Condition (ii) basically states two important behavioral properties: every time a boundary ambient is opened, this is done inside another boundary ambient; the only ambients that may exit from boundary ambients are boundary ambients. By induction on reduction rules of mobile ambients it is easy to prove the following information ow theorem. Note that the two conditions above are deÿnitely easy to check. Consider again the examples presented above. In particular,
does not satisfy condition (ii). In fact, out c container should be labeled as a boundary move by condition (i). However this makes a boundary move executable in a high-level ambient, invalidating condition (ii). On the other side, the second example
fulÿlls both the conditions, with c ∈ Lab t BM . This proves that hdata, in every execution, is always nested inside a boundary ambient, i.e., P 2 does not leak secret h.
The syntactic conditions successfully applies also to the extended example with hdata entering the ÿlter:
Also in this case, we are able to prove that P 3 does not leak h. Note that this was not provable through the control ow analysis introduced in Section 2.2.
The approach above may also be adapted to the case in which the external environment (e.g., any malicious process put in parallel with the analyzed process P) does not fulÿll the required conditions. This is indeed reasonable in a distributed open system. The idea is to suitably restrict the scope of boundary ambients and provide low-level ambients with some "taxi" processes that, once entered, bring the client inside restricted boundaries. Let b 1 ; : : : ; b n represent all the boundary ambients of process P. Then consider process
As b 1 ; : : : ; b n are restricted names, they may not appear in Q. As a consequence, if P fulÿlls the conditions (i) -(ii), this is su cient to prove that the whole system (whatever Q is considered) satisÿes such conditions, too. It is indeed simple to prove the following.
Note that processes !t i [in l b i ] allow any low-level ambient to enter boundary b i . So, legitimate ows from low to high-level are possible even if boundaries are restricted. Note also that the condition on the labeling of Q simply means that Q only contains low-level ambients and its capabilities are not (incorrectly) labeled as boundary moves.
Reÿning the control ow analysis
In this section we introduce a reÿnement of the control ow analysis of [12] reported in Section 2.2, that incorporates into the analysis the ideas discussed in Section 3, thus yielding to a more accurate tool for detecting unwanted boundary crossings. The resulting analysis improves also with respect to the syntactic properties presented in Section 3.3.
The main idea is to split theÎ component of the abstract domain in two (not necessarily disjoint) sets, that maintain nesting information about ambients protected by boundaries, and about "unprotected" ones, respectively.
The reÿned control ow analysis works on triplets (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ), where:
• The ÿrst componentÎ B is an element of˝(Lab a × (Lab a ∪ Lab t )). If a process contains either a capability or an ambient labeled ' inside an ambient labeled ' a which is a boundary or an ambient nested inside a boundary (referred as protected ambient) then (' a ; ') is expected to belong toÎ B . As long as a high-level datum is contained inside a protected ambient there is no unwanted information ow.
• The second componentÎ E is still an element of˝(Lab a × (Lab a ∪ Lab t )). If a process contains either a capability or an ambient labeled ' inside an ambient labeled ' a which is not protected, then (' a ; ') is expected to belong toÎ E . • The third componentĤ , as before, keeps track of the correspondence between names and labels. If a process contains an ambient labeled ' a with name n, then (' a ; n) is expected to belong toĤ .
Also in this case, the analysis is deÿned by a representation function and a speciÿcation. They are depicted, respectively, in Figs. 5 and 6. A pictorial representation of the most interesting application of the in-rule (i.e., the last one: a boundary crossing) is provided by Fig. 7 : the setsÎ E andÎ B before and after the move of ambient k into ambient n are represented by graphs (a) and (b), respectively. In particular, ambient k labeled as ' ∈ Lab a B is willing to enter ambient n labeled as ' ∈ Lab a B . In this case, all the nestings below ' have to be copied inÎ B since after the in move they become protected.
Observe that within the speciÿcation of the analysis (depicted in Fig. 6 ), some predicates are introduced that simplify the notation, namely The following holds. Theorem 4.3. Let P and Q be two processes such that ÿ B env (P) (
The proof of the Theorem can be obtained by showing that the new control ow analysis is induced from the analysis with occurrence counting of [13] , and it can be found in Section 5.
The result of the analysis should be read, as expected, in terms of information ows. No leakage of secret data=ambients outside the boundary ambients is possible if in the analysis h (high-level datum) does not appear in any of the pairs belonging toÎ E . Corollary 4.4. Let P be a process and h ∈ Lab a H a high-level label. Let ÿ B (P) (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ) and (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ) |= B P and ∀(' ; ' ) ∈Î E ; ' = h. Then; P does not leak secret h.
What about accuracy? The analysis just introduced is a reÿnement of the CFA in [12] and it properly deals with boundary nestings, in the spirit of Section 3. Referring again to example process P 3 , we may observe that our reÿned analysis properly captures the fact that the "ÿlter" is entered by conÿdential data only once it inside of boundary "london".
In addition, it deÿnitely improves in accuracy with respect to the mentioned syntactic property introduced in [2] . Consider, for instance, the following example, where the process discussed in the previous sections is extended by allowing an application (say an applet) to be downloaded from the web within london; then, the application may open the ambient send and disappear. Observe that in this case there is no information ow, as the application is not exporting any data out of the london boundary. In this case, our reÿned CFA yields to positive information (see the least solution reported below), whereas the syntactic property cannot be successfully applied. In fact, the (untrusted) application downloaded from the net is not a boundary, its open capability is labeled BM by the ÿrst rule, and thus the second rule cannot be satisÿed since ambient application is not labeled as a boundary (i.e., m ∈ Lab Observe that the result is also more accurate than the Hansen-Jensen-Nielsons's CFA [12] which computes the following least solution: Note that h appears inside an m ambient that at the beginning of the process is at the environmental level, but the analysis does not capture the fact that h enters m only after it has crossed the boundary and can never return back.
Correctness of the reÿned control ow analysis
In this section we prove the correctness of our reÿned CFA, as stated by Theorem 4.3. To do this, we strictly follow the approach of [13] , i.e., we prove that the new control ow analysis is induced from the analysis with occurrence counting. As a consequence, the analysis is semantically correct: each reduction of the semantics is adequately mimicked in the analysis.
First, let us recall some auxiliary deÿnitions in [13] :
• Induced satisfaction relation.
Let ( ; ) be a Galois connection of A in A , and let |=: A × Proc → {tt,ff} and |= : A × Proc → {tt,ff} be satisfaction relations.
The relation |= is said to be induced from the relation |= when ∀A ∈ A; P ∈ Proc: (A) |= P ⇔ A |= P:
• Approximate satisfaction relation.
Let ( ; ) be a Galois connection of A in A , and let |= :A × Proc → {tt,ff} and |= : A × Proc → {tt,ff} be satisfaction relations.
The relation |= is said to be approximate from the relation |= when ∀A ∈ A; P ∈ Proc : (A) |= P ⇐= A |= P:
• Induced representation function.
Let A A be a Galois connection, then a representation function ÿ : Proc → A is said to be induced from a representation function ÿ : Proc → A whenever:
Proposition 5.1 (Preservation of "global" correctness Nielson et al. [13] ). Assume |=; ÿ; |= and ÿ are given such that |= approximates |= and ÿ is induced from ÿ ; via the Galois connection A A. Then
for all P; Q; A and A .
The abstraction and concretization functions B ; B can be deÿned in terms of the occurrence counting domain, where a third componentÂ maintains multiplicity information, as follows: Let Á B :Î →Î B and Á E :Î →Î E be functions splittingÎ according to the boundary nestings, in 3
is compatible}:
The two functions Á B and Á E are deÿned in terms of protected and unprotected path predicates as follows:
: : : ; ' n : n ¿ 0 (' 0 ; ' 1 ); (' 1 ; ' 2 ); : : : ; (' n ; ' a ) ∈Î;
False otherwise: 
The abstraction and concretization functions B ; B form a Galois connection of our abstract domain of triplets into CountSet; i.e.,
• both functions are monotone; • C ⊆ B ( B (C)) for any C ∈ CountSet; • B ( B (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ )) (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ) for any triplet (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ).
The following proposition states that the reÿned control ow analysis is induced from the occurrence counting analysis. 3 According to [12] , a triplet (Î B;Î E ;Ĥ ) is compatible whenever the labels inÎ E ∪Î B are consistent with the mappinĝ H . More formally, if the following condition is satisÿed: if (' a ; ') ∈Î E ∪Î B or ('; ' a ) ∈Î E ∪Î B then there exists n such that (' a ; n) ∈ (Î;Ĥ ).
Proof. The proof follows the lines of the corresponding one in [13] . Namely; it su ces to prove
We just focus on proving point (i) by structural induction on process P (the proof of point (ii) is trivially obtained by rephrasing the corresponding proof in [13] ). The base of the induction is case P = 0, which is always veriÿed. The interesting cases arise when capabilities in, out and open apply.
Case 'in' (Figs. 8 and 9 ): Proof of "⇐=". Let us prove that
From the speciÿcation of the analysis depicted in Fig. 9 , it follows that (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ) |= B P. So, by induction hypothesis, we have B (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ) |= OC P. Then, consider (Î ;Ĥ ;Â ) ∈ B (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ) and ' a ; ' a ; ' a such that
By deÿnition of B , if (Î ;Ĥ ;Â ) ∈ B (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ), then (Î ;Ĥ ;Â ) is compatible and (Á B (Î ); Á E (Î );Ĥ ) (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ). It follows that:
We have to consider the three cases in Fig. 9 , the most informative one is case 3, when a boundary crossing occurs. In this case it also holds that either ('
. Then, we may look at the occurrence counting analysis. Observe that all the four triplets of Fig. 8 (Î ∪ {(' a ; ' a )};Ĥ ;Â);
are compatible, and only the pair (' a ; ' a ) is added toÎ . This pair is already known to be either in I E or inÎ B . Case 1 and case 2 of Fig. 9 are analogous.
Thus, it follows that all the triplets of From the speciÿcation of the occurrence counting analysis (see Fig. 8 
We know from [13] (Section 4.2) that
Given the deÿnition of B it follows that (' a ; ' a ) ∈Î E ∪Î B , and this concludes the proof that (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ) |= B in ' t n:P. The proof for out-capabilities is analogous. Then, to conclude the whole proof we have to consider the open capability. In this case, we need to consider the multiplicity of the ambients dealt with. From the speciÿcation of the analysis depicted in Fig. 11 , it follows that (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ) |= B P. So, by induction hypothesis we have B (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ) |= OC P. Then, consider (Î ;Ĥ ;Â ) ∈ B (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ) and ' a ; ' a such that
We have to consider the two cases depicted in Fig. 11 . The most interesting one is case 1, when a boundary is dissolved. In this case, it holds that either {('
. By looking at the occurrence counting analysis, we observe that all the triplets of Fig. 10 are compatible and at most add the pairs
which are already known to be either inÎ E or inÎ B . Case 2 of Fig. 11 is analogous. From the speciÿcation of the occurrence counting analysis (Fig. 10) We know from [13] that
For this choice of element in B (Î B ;Î E ;Ĥ ), in the speciÿcation of the analysis depicted in Fig. 10 we take
Then, it follows that:
Given the deÿnition of B , it follows that: 
Related works and conclusions
The main novelty of the approach presented in this paper is that we model multilevel information ow within a "pure" mobile ambient setting based on the seminal ideas presented in [12, 14] on ambient nesting analysis. We do not consider either channels or recently proposed restrictions of mobile ambients designed for security issues. There have been hardly any research e orts in this general direction. In fact, the most interesting recent contributions in the area mainly focused on either extending the ambient calculus thus enhancing its expressive power, or on building suitable type systems to verify security properties.
Among the type systems approaches, it is worth to mention [15] , where the authors introduce a new type system for tracking the behavior of mobile computations. They introduce the concept of name group, which represents a collection of ambient names. Using groups, the type system can impose to an ambient behavioral constraints on the set of ambients it may cross and the set of ambients it may open. It has the e ect of statically preventing certain communications through a mandatory access control policy, and can block accidental or malicious leakage of secrets.
Dezani and Salvo [16] extend the work of Cardelli et al. just mentioned, with a type system that also expresses security levels associated with ambients and provide further control over ambient movement and opening.
Among the language extensions, valuable proposals are described in [17, 10, 18, 19, 11] . Safe ambients is a modiÿcation of mobile ambients, where a movement or an ambient dissolution can take place only when the a ected ambient agrees, o ering the corresponding coaction. Boxed ambients [10] is another variant of the ambient calculus with a completely di erent model of communication, which results from dropping the open capability. In their paper, Bugliesi et al. deÿne also a type system that provides an e ective mechanism for resource protection and access control.
Few e orts have been put on the analysis approach to security issues in mobile ambients. In [20] , Degano et al. present a control ow analysis that mainly focuses on access control. The analysis relies on the use of coactions as a ÿlter to control access to resources.
We are currently extending our analysis to deal with coactions in order to evaluate beneÿts and disadvantages of the di erent formalisms of "information leakage" and of the corresponding analyses, and we are currently investigating how to extend our analysis to communication channels as well. Finally, the way we propose to express a multilevel information ow policy through the notion of boundary ambient, in our opinion, may also lead to interesting applications to model cryptographic protocols.
Appendix A. Operational semantics of mobile ambients
For the sake of completeness, we report the operational semantics of mobile ambients as described in [3] .
A.1. Structural congruence P ≡ P; P | Q ≡ Q | P;
P ≡ Q ⇒ Q ≡ P; (P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R); P ≡ Q; Q ≡ R ⇒ P ≡ R; !P ≡ P | !P;
P ≡ Q ⇒ ( n)P ≡ ( n)Q; ( n)( m)P ≡ ( m)( n)P; P ≡ P; P → Q; Q ≡ Q ⇒ P → Q ; P → Q ⇒ ( n)P → ( n)Q;
